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“As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of 
warfare…it has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space.” These 
words, written by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn last fall in Foreign Affairs, cemented the 
status of cyberspace as a domain of warfare like all others, and coincided nicely with US Cyber 
Command reaching its full operational capacity. Yet, suggestions of a strategy in the pages of this 
article and subsequent publications from Cyber Command and its four-star commander, Keith 
Alexander, belie the fundamental fact that the United States military, government, private sector, and 
citizenry are all seriously vulnerable to cyber attack and that we have no coherent plan to protect 
America. “Active defense,” by which Cyber Command means going offensive first, is not a strategy 
that will protect this nation. If anything is clear, it is that we have a remarkably well-developed 
offensive capability, but no commensurately serious commitment to defense. There is neither a plan 
nor any capability to defend America’s civilian infrastructure, from banking to telecoms to aviation. 
Perhaps the most important thing Americans can do to make us safer from cyber war is to discuss it, 
openly, in academic journals, to debate aspects of cyber war in Congress, and to educate the public 
and the world through mass media. Thus, this volume by the Naval Postgraduate School is an 
important step in improving our security as a nation.  
Given the central importance of net-centric warfare to our current military doctrine, I fear that this 
lack of clear thinking with regards to defense in cyberspace leaves not only our military, but our 
society as a whole, highly vulnerable to cyber attack. It will not be the first time that initial adopters 
of a new military technology, overcome with inertia or overconfident in the weapons they love and 
consider supreme, fail to defend effectively against that which they have just created. Thus it was 
that while American Colonel Billy Mitchell was the first to recognize the capability of small aircraft 
to destroy battleships, it was the Japanese Imperial Navy that most effectively harnessed this 
knowledge and nearly defeated the Americans in the Pacific during World War II. Great Britain 
invented the modern tank and a French Colonel, Charles de Gaulle, developed the first tactics of 
rapid attack with massed tanks supported by air and artillery. However, it was the Germans that 
perfected the tank design during the interwar period and employed de Gaulle’s tactics with horrific 
efficiency in what they referred to as blitzkrieg. I fear that we may be on the precipice of a similar 
situation in cyber war, one that may leave the American military hamstrung and the US civilian 
infrastructure shredded. 
Unlike the conventional examples from history, however, the threat to the United States in 
cyberspace will very likely not come from an adversary developing superior offensive capabilities. 
Rather it will be from one who can most effectively exploit the inherently asymmetrical nature of 
cyber war. While the notion of asymmetry in warfare is as old as the profession itself, its implications 
have rarely been so great as they are when placed in the context of cyber. To confront the United 
States military in conventional terms is a losing proposition; no other military today can surpass its 
capabilities on a tactical or strategic level. Yet, the conventional supremacy of the Americans is 
predicated upon a highly vulnerable foundation, its complete reliance upon information technology. 
Computers and networks enable all elements of the defense apparatus to function. From units in the 
field to procurement officers to strategic planners, all communications pass through various 
computer networks. Navigational and weapons systems aboard planes and ships depend on highly 
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sophisticated networked hardware and software, to say nothing of the thousands of satellites that 
provide imagery of nearly every inch of the earth. While this high degree of networking has brought 
unprecedented levels of productivity and efficiency, they also expose the entire operation to serious 
vulnerabilities. From the insider threat, as demonstrated by the WikiLeaks incidents, to the attacks 
that compromised the classified SIPRNet, to the hacking of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ 
personal computer, the examples of the vulnerabilities in cyberspace to our military abound. For this 
simple reason, the single most effective way to prevent units from communicating, procurements 
from taking place, or F-16s from properly acquiring targets, is to compromise chips and software in 
order to attack the network infrastructure and advanced weaponry of the net-centric giant. 
Nevertheless, for all of the potentially devastating implications for the United States military in a 
cyber war, such a war is probably not imminent. What ought to be of far greater importance not 
only to the United States, but to all industrialized nations, are the consequences of the current 
pandemic of economic cyber espionage. Economic warfare, which takes the shape of espionage 
conducted on an industrial scale against private corporations in all sectors across the globe, is 
happening every day. Intellectual property, proprietary information, bid and financial data – anything 
that comprises competitive knowledge in the digital global economy – is a potential target. The risks 
associated with such large-scale intellectual property theft pose an existential threat to the 
foundations of a state’s economic leadership, competitiveness, and well-being. In our inter-
connected world mutual dependencies among states abound, and thus, it would be in the long-term 
interest of few states to seek conventional war that could easily disrupt the delicate architecture of 
the global village. However, as the global competition for economic primacy intensifies in a 
knowledge-based global competition, the value of intellectual property, from research and 
development to biotech formulas to engineering designs, will only increase. China, among other 
nations, is systematically stealing terabytes of data at low cost, financially and diplomatically, and 
passing that data to its own companies. Private firms, limited by finite resources and obligations to 
maximize profits, will always lose against state-backed hackers unbound by such concerns. 
Governments, in the interest of maintaining economic stability, must therefore protect private 
industry and start the process of establishing an arms control regime in cyberspace. 
Arms control for cyber war is too often summarily dismissed with the question of attribution. Critics 
assert that if you cannot definitively determine who committed an attack, you cannot hold anyone 
accountable for violating an agreement. Definitely establishing the origin of cyber attacks is 
extremely difficult post facto, and in nearly all cases one only ends up with an educated guess. What 
the argument essentially says is that arms control in cyber war cannot work because it would be too 
hard to establish. This is a refrain that I encountered multiple times over the course of my career at 
the Pentagon, State Department, and White House. Whether it was conventional force reduction in 
Europe, nuclear weapons limitation and reduction with the Soviets, or international agreements on 
chemical and biological weapons, the initial reaction invoked, without fail, the “it’s too hard” 
argument. Yet we did, after long negotiations, draw down troop levels in Europe, and limit and 
reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in our arsenal and ban chemical and biological weapons. 
With persistence, there are solutions. A way around the attribution problem may be to include in an 
international agreement on cyber arms control an Obligation to Assist clause. Such a clause would 
require states party to share information on attacks as they were taking place, and would require that 
states cut off computers engaged in malicious activity, as confirmed by other parties and an 
international monitor. Such a convention obviates the attribution issue. The responsibility for 
malicious traffic rests with the state in which the malicious traffic originates, regardless of whether 
the actual attacker is located within its borders. I concede that this proposition is not perfect, but it 
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is perhaps the basis of a discussion that must begin now, because the risks are too grave and despite 
the associated difficulties, there is a great potential for good. 
Given the gravity of the implications of activities in this new domain of war fighting, it is vital that 
our national strategy be comprehensive, serious, and reflective of an open and frank debate, not just 
within the corridors of the Pentagon, but with academia and the broader public. Though the new 
Defense Department documents may suggest otherwise, “active defense” and “going first” do not 
constitute such a strategy. Again, I find myself reminded of historical precedent. In the early days of 
nuclear strategy, the Pentagon refused to share information regarding policies governing the use of 
nuclear weapons with anyone, let alone university professors. Yet as it became clear that the 
military’s plan to strike first with the entire nuclear arsenal was not an optimal strategy, civilian 
officials began to see the value of having academics like Bill Kauffman and Herman Khan dissect 
and analyze this all too important topic. Those whom Fred Kaplan has called “wizards of 
Armageddon” brought a much-needed critical eye to the nuclear strategy debate, and slowly backed 
the nation away from the dangers of a policy governed by a hair trigger. We need a similar debate 
today regarding cyber war. Should the US government keep secret its knowledge about software 
vulnerabilities that put the US economic infrastructure at risk? We do not know can who initiate 
cyber operations against a foreign entity, nor do we know how we would respond if we were the 
victims of a cyber attack. At what point would we respond kinetically? When does the response 
require presidential approval? These are but a small fraction of the number of critical, yet 
unanswered, questions about the national cyber strategy that need to be addressed. Fortunately, this 
journal and others like it are beginning to explore precisely these kinds of questions and analyze the 
issues associated with cyber war, work that will undoubtedly ultimately contribute to making us all 
safer. 
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